Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1200887
DOI10.1016/0895-7177(92)90086-ZzbMath0773.90015OpenAlexW2095094096MaRDI QIDQ1200887
Norman Schofield, Craig A. Tovey
Publication date: 16 January 1993
Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(92)90086-z
Related Items (8)
The ``probability of a fit choice ⋮ Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules ⋮ Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed ⋮ Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change ⋮ A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension ⋮ A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model ⋮ Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals ⋮ A general concept of majority rule
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- The size of the yolk: Computations for odd and even-numbered committees
- The vetoers in a simple game with ordinal preferences
- Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets
- The structure of continuous-valued neutral monotonic social functions
- Structural instability of the core
- Local optimization on graphs
- Smooth social choice
- Generic properties of simple Bergson-Samuelson welfare functions
- The probability of an undominated central voter in 2-dimensional spatial majority voting
- A dynamical model of political equilibrium
- The almost surely shrinking yolk
- Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
- On 64%-Majority Rule
- Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
- Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
This page was built for publication: Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences
