Probability and convergence for supra-majority rule with Euclidean preferences

DOI10.1016/0895-7177(92)90086-ZzbMath0773.90015OpenAlexW2095094096MaRDI QIDQ1200887

Norman Schofield, Craig A. Tovey

Publication date: 16 January 1993

Published in: Mathematical and Computer Modelling (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0895-7177(92)90086-z

zbMATH Keywords

corevotinginstability dimensionsupra-majority

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (8)

The ``probability of a fit choice ⋮ Probabilities of preferences and cycles with super majority rules ⋮ Toward a \(50\%\)-majority equilibrium when voters are symmetrically distributed ⋮ Coalitions and Catastrophic Climate Change ⋮ A polynomial-time algorithm for computing the yolk in fixed dimension ⋮ A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model ⋮ Dominance in spatial voting with imprecise ideals ⋮ A general concept of majority rule

Cites Work

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• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• The almost surely shrinking yolk
• Generalized Symmetry Conditions at a Core Point
• On 64%-Majority Rule
• Aggregation and Social Choice: A Mean Voter Theorem
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule

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