Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
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Publication:1201140
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90038-JzbMath0760.90098MaRDI QIDQ1201140
Publication date: 17 January 1993
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
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