Evolution and strategic stability: From Maynard Smith to Kohlberg and Mertens

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90039-KzbMath0768.90099MaRDI QIDQ1201141

Jeroen M. Swinkels

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

evolutionstrategically stable subset

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Noncooperative games (91A10)

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Cites Work

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• Evolutionary stability with equilibrium entrants
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Social Stability and Equilibrium
• On the Definition of the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept