On the evolution of optimizing behavior

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(92)90042-GzbMath0753.92018OpenAlexW4213418955MaRDI QIDQ1201144

Eddie Dekel, Suzanne Scotchmer

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(92)90042-g

zbMATH Keywords

replicator dynamicslearning processmixed strategiessurvival of the fittestpure strategiesnever-fittest strategy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites Work

• ``Evolutionary selection dynamic in games: Convergence and limit properties
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• Bayesian learning in normal form games
• Adaptive and sophisticated learning in normal form games
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Three characterizations of population strategy stability
• Strategy stability in complex populations
• Evolutionary Games in Economics
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