Communication, correlation, and symmetry in bargaining

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90264-YzbMath0759.90102OpenAlexW2143010704MaRDI QIDQ1201839

Karl Wärneryd

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90264-y

zbMATH Keywords

communicationsubgame perfect equilibriumtwo-player normal form games

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (2)

Neutrally stable outcomes in cheap-talk coordination games ⋮ Egalitarianism and efficiency in repeated symmetric games

Cites Work

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• A note on the strategic transmission of endogenous information
• Communication between rational agents
• Credible negotiation statements and coherent plans
• Cheap-talk and cooperation in a society
• Evolutionary stability in unanimity games with cheap talk
• Computation as a correlation device
• Cheap talk, coordination, and evolutionary stability
• An Approach to Communication Equilibria
• Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality
• Strategic Information Transmission
• An Evolutionary Approach to Pre-Play Communication
• Equilibrium points in n -person games

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