Dynamic implementation in two-agent economies

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90266-2zbMath0759.90010OpenAlexW2069781116MaRDI QIDQ1201842

Pierre de Trenqualye

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90266-2

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic mechanismindividually rational allocationsnon-monotonic preferencesPareto efficient mechanismspublic good economiestwo-agent economy

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Public goods (91B18) General equilibrium theory (91B50) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (1)

Incentive compatibility without compensation

Cites Work

• Smooth versus discontinuous mechanisms
• A feasible Nash implementation of Walrasian equilibria in the two-agent economy
• Outcome Functions Yielding Walrasian and Lindahl Allocations at Nash Equilibrium Points
• A Simple Incentive Compatible Scheme for Attaining Lindahl Allocations
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• A Tatonement Process for Public Goods

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