The revelation approach to Nash implementation

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90267-3zbMath0766.90007OpenAlexW1988470997MaRDI QIDQ1201843

Stefan Reichelstein, Dilip Mookherjee

Publication date: 17 January 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90267-3

zbMATH Keywords

implementationNash equilibrium strategiessocial choice ruleincentive compatibility and selective elimination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (2)

The revelation approach to Nash implementation ⋮ Robust virtual implementation with almost complete information

Cites Work

• The revelation approach to Nash implementation
• Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation
• Implementation with Incomplete Information in Exchange Economies
• Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality
• Implementation via Augmented Revelation Mechanisms

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