Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
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Publication:1202563
DOI10.1007/BF01258276zbMath0769.90005OpenAlexW2082041392MaRDI QIDQ1202563
Ton Storcken, H. J. M. Peters, Hans van der Stel
Publication date: 14 February 1993
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01258276
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Cites Work
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- A class of solutions for multiperson multicriteria decision making
- Algebraic aggregation theory
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- Pareto optimality, anonymity, and strategy-proofness in location problems
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
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- Strategy-proof voting schemes with continuous preferences
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- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Straightforward Elections, Unanimity and Phantom Voters
- Impossibility of Strategy-Proof Mechanisms in Economies with Pure Public Goods
- The Division Problem with Single-Peaked Preferences: A Characterization of the Uniform Allocation Rule
