Approximate implementation in the absence of externalities and aggregate feasibility constraints

DOI10.1016/0165-1765(92)90285-7zbMath0825.90040OpenAlexW1966926902MaRDI QIDQ1206350

Jonathani Glover

Publication date: 1 April 1993

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-1765(92)90285-7

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites Work

• Optimal incentive contracts with multiple agents
• Stopping agents from ``cheating
• A simpler mechanism that stops agents from cheating
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
• Rationalizable Strategic Behavior
• Virtual Implementation in Iteratively Undominated Strategies: Complete Information

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