Implementing Lindahl allocations by a withholding mechanism
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Publication:1207011
DOI10.1016/0304-4068(93)90046-NzbMath0770.90013MaRDI QIDQ1207011
Publication date: 4 May 1993
Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)
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