Sequential voting by veto: Making the Mueller-Moulin algorithm more versatile

DOI10.1007/BF00133642zbMath0773.90014OpenAlexW2090491812MaRDI QIDQ1207320

Moshé Machover, Dan S. Felsenthal

Publication date: 1 April 1993

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133642

zbMATH Keywords

Pareto optimalitysophisticated votingsequential voting by veto

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Computational methods for problems pertaining to operations research and mathematical programming (90-08)

Related Items (4)

A lemma in open sequential voting by veto ⋮ Properties of open procedure of sequential veto-voting ⋮ The effects of communication on the occurrence of the tyranny of the majority under voting by veto ⋮ A solution to the two-person implementation problem

Cites Work

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• Sophisticated voting outcomes and agenda control
• Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
• A multistage game representation of sophisticated voting for binary procedures
• Black and Farquharson on order-of-voting effects: An extension

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