A signaling theory of congressional oversight

DOI10.1006/GAME.1993.1003zbMath0770.90085OpenAlexW2084426342MaRDI QIDQ1207824

B. Peter Rosendorff, Charles M. Cameron

Publication date: 16 May 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1003

zbMATH Keywords

asymmetric informationcostly signalingsequential equilibriapooling equilibriumtake-it-or-leave-it bargaining game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) History, political science (91F10)

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