Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1207827
DOI10.1006/game.1993.1006zbMath0825.90824OpenAlexW1976528234MaRDI QIDQ1207827
Publication date: 16 May 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/956.pdf
Related Items (9)
Citizen candidates under uncertainty ⋮ The number of parties and decision-making in legislatures ⋮ The pro-competitive effect of campaign limits in non-majoritarian elections ⋮ Extreme parties and political rents ⋮ The wasted vote phenomenon with uncertain voter population ⋮ Would letting people vote for multiple candidates yield policy moderation? ⋮ Dynamic models for coordinating private and public interests in economic corruption ⋮ Comparison of scoring rules in Poisson voting games ⋮ Approval voting with endogenous candidates
This page was built for publication: Effectiveness of electoral systems for reducing government corruption: A game-theoretic analysis
