Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1207828
DOI10.1006/game.1993.1007zbMath0825.90825OpenAlexW2003896702MaRDI QIDQ1207828
Publication date: 16 May 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1007
Related Items (20)
Electoral competition under best-worst voting rules ⋮ Policy convergence under approval and plurality voting: the role of policy commitment ⋮ Aggregate uncertainty in the citizen candidate model yields extremist parties ⋮ Trimmed equilibrium ⋮ Stability in electoral competition: a case for multiple votes ⋮ A Hotelling-Downs model of electoral competition with the option to quit ⋮ Essential collections for equilibrium concepts ⋮ Nash equilibrium in a spatial model of coalition bargaining ⋮ Mixed equilibria in runoff elections ⋮ Many-candidate Nash equilibria for elections involving random selection ⋮ Nash equilibria for voter models with randomly perceived positions ⋮ Uncontested incumbents and incumbent upsets ⋮ On the influence of extreme parties in electoral competition with policy-motivated candidates ⋮ When winning is the only thing: pure strategy Nash equilibria in a three-candidate spatial voting model ⋮ The Hotelling-Downs model with runoff voting ⋮ Entry-deterring policy differentiation by electoral candidates ⋮ Computing equilibrium in network utility-sharing and discrete election games ⋮ Bounding quality of pure Nash equilibria in dual-role facility location games ⋮ Does party polarization affect the electoral prospects of a new centrist candidate? ⋮ Symmetric zero-sum games with only asymmetric equilibria
This page was built for publication: Candidate positioning and entry in a political competition
