The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games

DOI10.1006/GAME.1993.1008zbMath0770.90091OpenAlexW2004372975MaRDI QIDQ1207830

Brigitte Sloth

Publication date: 16 May 1993

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1008

zbMATH Keywords

large sequential decision gamesvoting situations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

The complexity of online bribery in sequential elections ⋮ The complexity of online manipulation of sequential elections ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ The complexity of controlling candidate-sequential elections ⋮ The welfare consequences of strategic voting in two commonly used parliamentary agendas

This page was built for publication: The theory of voting and equilibria in noncooperative games