Weighted voting, multicameral representation, and power
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Publication:1207831
DOI10.1006/game.1993.1009zbMath0765.90030OpenAlexW1482693011MaRDI QIDQ1207831
William S. Zwicker, Alan D. Taylor
Publication date: 16 May 1993
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1993.1009
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