Stability of voting games

DOI10.1007/BF00187432zbMath0781.90102OpenAlexW2061193005MaRDI QIDQ1208125

Shuhe Li

Publication date: 16 May 1993

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00187432

zbMATH Keywords

stable setwinning coalitionfar-sighted coreproper symmetric simple game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (9)

The legislative calendar ⋮ Committees with farsighted voters: A new interpretation of stable sets ⋮ Quota games and stability set of order \(d\) ⋮ Cooperation, stability and social welfare under majority rule ⋮ Networks and Stability ⋮ A characterization of social choice correspondences that implement the core of simple games ⋮ A core of voting games with improved foresight ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ Coalitional stability with a credibility constraint

This page was built for publication: Stability of voting games