Implementation in perfect equilibria

DOI10.1007/BF00187436zbMath0779.90009OpenAlexW2883551943MaRDI QIDQ1208131

Tomas Sjöström

Publication date: 16 May 1993

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00187436

zbMATH Keywords

social choice rulelotteries over a finite set of alternativestrembling hand perfect equilibria

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (5)

Virtual Nash implementation with admissible support ⋮ Subgame perfect implementation of voting rules via randomized mechanisms ⋮ Implementation Theory ⋮ Undominated Nash implementation with collusion and renegotiation ⋮ Nash implementation and double implementation: Equivalence theorems

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