A stochastic bargaining process for \(n\)-person games

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(74)90008-1zbMath0292.90068OpenAlexW2045076375MaRDI QIDQ1211927

Wilhelm Neuefeind

Publication date: 1974

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(74)90008-1

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Related Items (6)

Competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in an \(n\)-person game ⋮ A dynamic recontracting process for multiple-type housing markets ⋮ Satisficing ⋮ An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations ⋮ The equivalence of the minimal dominant set and the myopic stable set for coalition function form games ⋮ The core as the set of eventually stable outcomes: a note

Cites Work

• Cores of convex games
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Some theorems on the core of ann-Game without Side-Payments
• Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria
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