Cooperative games with coalition structures
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Publication:1220434
DOI10.1007/BF01766876zbMath0313.90074OpenAlexW2068985771MaRDI QIDQ1220434
Jacques H. Drèze, Robert John Aumann
Publication date: 1974
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01766876
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