How to share the cost of a public good

DOI10.1007/BF01780629zbMath0318.90012MaRDI QIDQ1222574

Paul Champsaur

Publication date: 1975

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

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Cites Work

• Cores of convex games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
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