Dictators on blocks: Generalizations of social choice impossibility theorems

DOI10.1016/0095-8956(76)90008-3zbMath0319.90012OpenAlexW2069404105MaRDI QIDQ1223022

Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Journal of Combinatorial Theory. Series B (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-8956(76)90008-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Mathematical economics (91B99) Mathematical psychology (91E99)

Related Items (5)

Social choice in economic environments ⋮ On strategy-proof social choice under categorization ⋮ Dichotomous preferences and the possibility of Arrovian social choice ⋮ Common preference, non-consequential features, and collective decision making ⋮ The limitations of the Arrovian consistency of domains with a fixed preference

Cites Work

• The Voting Problem
• Impossibility Theorems without the Social Completeness Axiom
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
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