Optimal strategies in repeated games with incomplete information
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Publication:1223024
DOI10.1007/BF01766399zbMath0319.90076OpenAlexW1563112855MaRDI QIDQ1223024
Publication date: 1975
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01766399
Related Items (25)
Bush‐Mosteller learning for a zero-sum repeated game with random pay-offs ⋮ An application of hierarchical structure automata to the co-operative game with incomplete information ⋮ On a Unified Framework for Approachability with Full or Partial Monitoring ⋮ The Value of Markov Chain Games with Incomplete Information on Both Sides ⋮ Approachability of convex sets in generalized quitting games ⋮ Correlation and unmediated cheap talk in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ On repeated games with incomplete information played by non-Bayesian players ⋮ Approachability of convex sets in games with partial monitoring ⋮ Approachability, regret and calibration: implications and equivalences ⋮ Learning from private information in noisy repeated games ⋮ Pure equilibria of repeated games with public observation. ⋮ A primal condition for approachability with partial monitoring ⋮ Strong approachability ⋮ Repeated Games with Complete Information ⋮ Repeated Games with Incomplete Information ⋮ Unnamed Item ⋮ General properties of long-run supergames ⋮ Communication equilibrium payoffs in repeated games with imperfect monitoring ⋮ The information revealed in infinitely-repeated games of incomplete information ⋮ A differential game on Wasserstein space. Application to weak approachability with partial monitoring ⋮ Extensions of the Cav(u) Theorem for Repeated Games with Incomplete Information on One Side ⋮ Solution for a class of repeated games without a recursive structure ⋮ Repeated two-player games with ruin ⋮ On a repeated game with state dependent signalling matrices ⋮ Equilibrium existence and topology in some repeated games with incomplete information
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