Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(75)90026-5zbMath0329.90079OpenAlexW2036822337MaRDI QIDQ1227673

Mamoru Kaneko

Publication date: 1975

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90026-5

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (2)

Reduction theorems in the social choice theory ⋮ The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a majority game
• Stability in Voting
• A Possibility Theorem on Majority Decisions
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule

This page was built for publication: Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory