Competitive outcomes in the cores of market games

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Publication:1231846

DOI10.1007/BF01769270zbMath0341.90070OpenAlexW2011938313MaRDI QIDQ1231846

Lloyd S. Shapley, Martin Shubik

Publication date: 1975

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01769270




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