The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game

DOI10.1007/BF01753316zbMath0347.90073OpenAlexW2058535895MaRDI QIDQ1234257

K. G. Vaidya, S. C. Littlechild

Publication date: 1976

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01753316

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80)

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Cites Work

• A simple expression for the nucleolus in a special case
• Observations on the nucleolus and the central game
• Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game