Necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a nonempty core of a majority game

DOI10.1007/BF01769268zbMath0347.90074MaRDI QIDQ1234258

Mamoru Kaneko

Publication date: 1975

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items (3)

Note on the core and compensation in collective choice ⋮ Necessary and sufficient conditions for transitivity in voting theory ⋮ The ratio equilibrium and a voting game in a public goods economy

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• On the k-stability of m-quota games
• Stability in Voting

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