Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90132-6zbMath0352.90017OpenAlexW2021109724MaRDI QIDQ1236060

Mordecai Kurz

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90132-6

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60)

Related Items

Achieving efficiency with manipulative bargainers, Income distribution and distortion of preferences. The l commodity case, Income distribution and distortion of preferences: The l commodity case, Wealth and power in a collegial polity, Beyond myopic best response (in Cournot competition), Manipulation of preferences and relative utilitarianism, Voting, bargaining, and factor income distribution, Unnamed Item

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Power and taxes in a multi-commodity economy
• Incentives in Teams
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" Problem
• Power and Taxes