On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
From MaRDI portal
Publication:1236076
DOI10.1007/BF01780630zbMath0352.90085OpenAlexW1968958679MaRDI QIDQ1236076
Publication date: 1975
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01780630
Related Items (only showing first 100 items - show all)
The Vertex Cover Game ⋮ An Axiomatization for Two Power Indices for (3,2)-Simple Games ⋮ Indices of Criticality in Simple Games ⋮ The Banzhaf Value and General Semivalues for Differentiable Mixed Games ⋮ Null players, outside options, and stability: the conditional Shapley value ⋮ IMPORTANCE IN SYSTEMS WITH INTERVAL DECISIONS ⋮ A NEW CHARACTERIZATION OF THE BANZHAF INDEX OF POWER ⋮ Characterizations of power indices based on null player free winning coalitions ⋮ Duality and anti-duality in TU games applied to solutions, axioms, and axiomatizations ⋮ Three-valued simple games ⋮ Monotonic games are spanning network games ⋮ Power indices for political and financial decision making: A review ⋮ A class of non-normalized power indices for simple games ⋮ A characterization and some properties of the Banzhaf-Coleman-Dubey-Shapley sensitivity index ⋮ The Shapley value for shortest path games: a non-graph-based approach ⋮ Success and decisiveness on proper symmetric games ⋮ Postulates and paradoxes of relative voting power -- A critical re-appraisal ⋮ Power Indices Applied to Portuguese Parliament ⋮ Alternative axiomatic characterizations of the Shapley and Banzhaf values ⋮ On an axiomatization of the Banzhaf value without the additivity axiom ⋮ The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games ⋮ Characterizations of the Deegan-Packel and Johnston power indices ⋮ Balanced externalities and the Shapley value ⋮ Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value ⋮ An axiomatization of the Banzhaf value ⋮ Effectivity and power ⋮ The conditional Shapley-Shubik measure for ternary voting games ⋮ The axiom of equivalence to individual power and the Banzhaf index ⋮ The Shapley value on some lattices of monotonic games ⋮ An axiomatic characterization of the Owen-Shapley spatial power index ⋮ Bargaining in committees as an extension of Nash's bargaining theory ⋮ Generalized Coleman-Shapley indices and total-power monotonicity ⋮ On the externality-free Shapley-Shubik index ⋮ Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values ⋮ The equivalence of uniform and Shapley value-based cost allocations in a specific game ⋮ Utility functions for simple games ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for multi-criteria simple games ⋮ Semivalues as power indices. ⋮ The pairwise egalitarian solution. ⋮ Players indifferent to cooperate and characterizations of the Shapley value ⋮ Power indices as elements of projective space ⋮ A class of power indices for voting games ⋮ Circumstantial power: Optimal persuadable voters ⋮ Voting power in the EU council of ministers and fair decision making in distributive politics ⋮ A relation-algebraic approach to simple games ⋮ Power distribution in the Basque parliament using games with externalities ⋮ Subjective evaluations of n-person games ⋮ On authority distributions in organizations: Equilibrium. ⋮ Characterization of an inconsistency ranking for pairwise comparison matrices ⋮ Characterization of the Shapley-Shubik power index without the efficiency axiom ⋮ A probabilistic synopsis of binary decision rules ⋮ Strategic versus non-strategic voting power in the EU council of ministers: the consultation procedure ⋮ The Shapley-Shubik index for simple games with multiple alternatives ⋮ Noncooperative foundations of bargaining power in committees and the Shapley-Shubik index ⋮ Power indices expressed in terms of minimal winning coalitions ⋮ An axiomatization of success ⋮ Voting power and proportional representation of voters ⋮ Random order coalition structure values ⋮ Restriction of simple games ⋮ Axiomatizations for the Shapley-Shubik power index for games with several levels of approval in the input and output ⋮ Axiomatizing the public good index via merging and new arrival properties ⋮ Consecutive amalgamations and an axiomatization of the Shapley value ⋮ Axiomatics for power indices in the weighted games ⋮ Uniqueness of the Shapley value ⋮ Voting and Power ⋮ A Review of Some Recent Results on Power Indices ⋮ On the Nucleolus as a Power Index ⋮ Circumstantial Power: Some Hints for Finding Optimal Persuadable or Bribable Voters ⋮ Computing power indices: multilinear extensions and new characterizations ⋮ Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility ⋮ Monotonicity and dummy free property for multi-choice cooperative games ⋮ On connections between individual values and coalition values for games in characteristic function form ⋮ A power analysis of linear games with consensus ⋮ Compound voting and the Banzhaf index ⋮ A decisiveness index for simple games ⋮ The vector lattice structure of the \(n\)-person TU games ⋮ Axiomatics for power indices that account for player preferences ⋮ An issue based power index ⋮ Voting power measurement: a story of misreinvention ⋮ Interaction indices for games on combinatorial structures with forbidden coalitions ⋮ Decomposition of games with non-empty core into veto-controlled simple games ⋮ The power of the largest player ⋮ A Shapley measure of power in hierarchies ⋮ A new index of power for simple n-person games ⋮ Cooperative bargaining foundations of the Shapley-Shubik index ⋮ Indirect control and power in mutual control structures ⋮ Negotiating team formation using deep reinforcement learning ⋮ Combinatorial properties of phylogenetic diversity indices ⋮ On axiomatizations of the Shapley value for assignment games ⋮ Axiomatizations of game theoretical solutions for one-output cost sharing problems ⋮ Transversality of the Shapley value ⋮ SEMIVALUES AND VOTING POWER ⋮ New mathematical properties of the Banzhaf value ⋮ Interval measures of power ⋮ A NOTE ON THE CARRERAS-COLEMAN DECISIVENESS INDEX ⋮ Minimal-axiom characterizations of the Coleman and Banzhaf indices of voting power ⋮ Composition independence in compound games: a characterization of the Banzhaf power index and the Banzhaf value ⋮ Set-weighted games and their application to the cover problem ⋮ Common behaviour of power indices ⋮ Characterization of a value for games under restricted cooperation
Cites Work
This page was built for publication: On the uniqueness of the Shapley value
