When you don't need to join: The effects of guaranteed payoffs on bargaining in three-person cooperative games

DOI10.1007/BF00133407zbMath0354.90098OpenAlexW2004337313MaRDI QIDQ1236977

James P. Kahan, Amnon Rapoport

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00133407

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Comparison of theories for payoff disbursement of coalition values, Coalition formation in the triad when two are weak and one is strong, Bargaining set theory and stability in coalition governments, A note on the equal division kernel and the α‐power model, The power of a coalition and payoff disbursement in three‐person negotiable conflicts

Cites Work

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