Manipulation of social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(76)90016-8zbMath0358.90005OpenAlexW1986409722MaRDI QIDQ1238741

Publication date: 1976

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(76)90016-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35)

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