Axioms for expected utility in \(n\)-person games

DOI10.1007/BF01753315zbMath0358.90088OpenAlexW1967673200WikidataQ114693787 ScholiaQ114693787MaRDI QIDQ1238753

Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 1976

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01753315

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items

Aggregation of Paretian preferences for independent individual uncertainties, Axioms for measuring utility on partial mixture sets, A derivation of expected utilty maximization in the context of a game, Non-cooperative stochastic dominance games, Mixture axioms in linear and multilinear utility theories, Positive-difference structures and bilinear utility functions, Time preferences, conditional risk preference, and two-period cardinal utility

Cites Work

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• Unbounded expected utility
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• Le Comportement de l'Homme Rationnel devant le Risque: Critique des Postulats et Axiomes de l'Ecole Americaine