Stability of social choices in infinitely large societies

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90129-6zbMath0362.90007OpenAlexW2015813727MaRDI QIDQ1240133

Elisha A. Pazner, Eugene Wesley

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://www.kellogg.northwestern.edu/research/math/papers/154.pdf

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99)

Related Items

Continuity of social choice functions with restricted coalition algebras, Stable preference aggregation with infinite population, Maskin monotonicity and infinite individuals, The strategy-proof social choice functions, Outcomes of admissible Nash equilibria and sophisticated voting when decisions are based on pairwise comparisons, Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings, Type two computability of social choice functions and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem in an infinite society, The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem of social choice theory in an infinite society and LPO (limited principle of omniscience), A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions, The structure of two-valued coalitional strategy-proof social choice functions, On the terminology of economic design: a critical assessment and some proposals

Cites Work

• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Model theory
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Cheatproofness Properties of the Plurality Rule in Large Societies
• Measurable cardinals and analytic games
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