A voting model for the allocation of public goods: Existence of an equilibrium

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90133-8zbMath0363.90008OpenAlexW1971703715MaRDI QIDQ1240647

Steven M. Slutsky

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90133-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Trade models (91B60)

Related Items (4)

A group majority voting model of public good provision ⋮ Existence of voting-market equilibria ⋮ The general relevance of the impossibility theorem in smooth social choice ⋮ A problem with Euclidean preferences in spatial models of politics.

Cites Work

• Sophisticated voting over multidimensional choice spaces†
• Social Preference Orderings and Majority Rule
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
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