Power and taxes in a multi-commodity economy

DOI10.1007/BF02756484zbMath0363.90017OpenAlexW1981328491MaRDI QIDQ1240651

Mordecai Kurz, Robert John Aumann

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Israel Journal of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02756484

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games with infinitely many players (91A07) Trade models (91B60) Other game-theoretic models (91A40)

Related Items (14)

An inner core equivalence theorem ⋮ Linear measures of inequality for cooperative games ⋮ The manipulability of the Shapley-value ⋮ Income distribution and distortion of preferences. The l commodity case ⋮ Income distribution and distortion of preferences: The l commodity case ⋮ Wealth and power in a collegial polity ⋮ Voting and paying for public goods: An application of the theory of the core ⋮ Social optimality and cooperation in nonatomic congestion games. ⋮ Distortion of preferences, income distribution, and the case for a linear income tax ⋮ Weighted majority games have many \(\mu\)-values ⋮ Limit properties of power indices in a class of representative systems ⋮ Voting, bargaining, and factor income distribution ⋮ Why do some good bear higher taxes than others? ⋮ A characterization of vector measure games in pNA

Cites Work

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• A variational problem arising in economics
• Values of games with a continuum of prayers
• On rings of operators. Reduction theory
• The Bargaining Problem
• Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games
• Values of Non-Atomic Games
• Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders
• Power and Taxes
• Quasi-Cores in a Monetary Economy with Nonconvex Preferences
• Pareto Optimality for a Measure Space of Economic Agents
• Two-Person Cooperative Games

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