Existence of stable situations, restricted preferences, and strategic manipulation under democratic group decision rules

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90069-2zbMath0365.90143OpenAlexW1985216468MaRDI QIDQ1241396

Bhaskar Dutta

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90069-2

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Related Items

Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities ⋮ Strategic manipulation and the use of individual decision rules ⋮ Multivalued social choice functions and strategic manipulation with counterthreats ⋮ Dominant strategies and restricted ballots with variable electorate ⋮ A condition for Nash-stability under binary and democratic group decision functions ⋮ Restricted domains, Arrow social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private and public alternatives ⋮ Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives ⋮ Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case

Cites Work

• Collective rationality and strategy-proofness of group decision rules
• Non-cooperative games
• Stability in Voting
• Strategic Voting Without Collusion Under Binary and Democratic Group Decision Rules
• Threats, Counter-Threats, and Strategic Voting
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
• On Nicely Consistent Voting Systems
• The Simple Majority Decision Rule
• On a Class of Equilibrium Conditions for Majority Rule
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