A further result on the core of voting games

DOI10.1007/BF01770873zbMath0368.90136MaRDI QIDQ1242821

Richard E. Wendell, Maurice Salles

Publication date: 1977

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items

Unifying voting theory from Nakamura's to Greenberg's theorems ⋮ SOCIAL CHOICE AND COOPERATIVE GAME THEORY: VOTING GAMES AS SOCIAL AGGREGATION FUNCTIONS ⋮ Classification theorem for smooth social choice on a manifold ⋮ Aggregation of preferences: The fuzzy case

Cites Work

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• The core of a simple game with ordinal preferences
• Stability in Voting
• Existence of a "Local" Co-operative Equilibrium in a Class of Voting Games
• Characterization of Transitive Individual Preferences for Quasi-Transitive Collective Preference under Simple Games
• Voting Equilibria in Multidimensional Choice Spaces

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