Sophisticated voting with information for two voting functions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90073-4zbMath0367.90004OpenAlexW2085773137WikidataQ56553627 ScholiaQ56553627MaRDI QIDQ1242842

Andrew B. Whinston, Rony M. Adelsman

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90073-4

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Decision theory for games (91A35)

Cites Work

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• Positionalist voting functions
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• Discriminant Functions and Majority Voting
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Majority Decisions and Transitivity: Some Special Cases
• The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance

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