A further note on Arrow's impossibility theorem

DOI10.1016/0304-4068(77)90008-8zbMath0367.90007OpenAlexW2076437317MaRDI QIDQ1242843

Norbert Schmitz

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-4068(77)90008-8

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items (13)

Arrow's theorem for economic environments and effective social preferences ⋮ Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel ⋮ Arrow's theorem with restricted coalition algebras ⋮ A representative individual from Arrovian aggregation of parametric individual utilities ⋮ Intergenerational social choice without the Pareto principle ⋮ The categorical approach to social choice theory ⋮ Quasi-decisiveness, quasi-ultrafilter, and social quasi-orderings ⋮ Computational application of the mathematical theory of democracy to Arrow's impossibility theorem (how dictatorial are Arrow's dictators?) ⋮ On continuity of Arrovian social welfare functions ⋮ Anonymity in large societies ⋮ Preference aggregation and atoms in measures ⋮ Ultraproducts and aggregation ⋮ Limiting dictatorial rules

Cites Work

• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
• Extensions of measure
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