Manipulation of social decision functions
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Publication:1244157
DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90101-6zbMath0372.90005OpenAlexW1987496341MaRDI QIDQ1244157
Publication date: 1977
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90101-6
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