Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(77)90067-9zbMath0374.90001OpenAlexW2082419013MaRDI QIDQ1245060

William V. Gehrlein, Peter C. Fishburn

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90067-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16)

Related Items

Evaluation of some weighted majority decision rules under dependent voting ⋮ Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules ⋮ The network of weighted majority rules and weighted majority games ⋮ Resolute majority rules ⋮ Comparison of the polar decision rules for various types of distributions ⋮ Between the expert and majority rules ⋮ Partial information on decisional competences and the desirability of the expert rule in uncertain dichotomous choice situations ⋮ Performance evaluation of some special classes of weighted majority rules ⋮ Collective decision making in hierarchies ⋮ Simple majority voting isn't special ⋮ Mechanism design with two alternatives in quasi-linear environments

Cites Work

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• The probability of the paradox of voting: A computable solution
• The Existence of Social Welfare Functions
• INTERSECTION THEOREMS FOR SYSTEMS OF FINITE SETS
• On Collective Rationality and a Generalized Impossibility Theorem
• Formal Structure of Majority Decision
• General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
• Social Choice Functions