The chain store paradox
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Publication:1245077
DOI10.1007/BF00131770zbMath0374.90085OpenAlexW4232703759MaRDI QIDQ1245077
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00131770
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