Values of games in partition function form

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Publication:1245166

DOI10.1007/BF01770871zbMath0373.90091OpenAlexW2072385627MaRDI QIDQ1245166

Roger B. Myerson

Publication date: 1977

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01770871




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