On the contribution of a player to a game

DOI10.1007/BF01761602zbMath0373.90092MaRDI QIDQ1245167

K. Appert

Publication date: 1976

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

Related Items

Allocating joint costs by means of the nucleolus, (Pre)kernel catchers for cooperative games, Remarks on the reasonable set of outcomes in a general coalition function form game, Upper and lower bounds of the kernel and nucleolus, On pseudo-Anosov autoequivalences

Cites Work

• The inequalities that determine the bargaining set \({\mathcal M}_ 1^ {(1)}\).
• \(n\)-person games with only 1, \(n-1\), and \(n\)-person permissible coalitions
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game
• The kernel of a cooperative game
• An application of nonstandard analysis to game theory