Complements, mollifiers and the propensity to disrupt

DOI10.1007/BF01763119zbMath0373.90094MaRDI QIDQ1245169

A. Charnes, Lawrence M. Seiford, John J. Rousseau

Publication date: 1978

Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12)

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Cites Work

• On the formation of unions in \(n\)-person games
• The propensity to disrupt and the disruption nucleolus of a characteristic function game
• Sharing the Gains from Regional Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Application to Planning Investment in Electric Power
• Unnamed Item