Random evolutionarily stable strategies

DOI10.1016/0040-5809(78)90047-3zbMath0373.92017OpenAlexW2037584321WikidataQ52795787 ScholiaQ52795787MaRDI QIDQ1245183

George F. Oster, John Guckenheimer, D. M. Auslander

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0040-5809(78)90047-3

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25)

Related Items

Evolutionary games and two species population dynamics ⋮ Non-cooperative two-person games in biology: A classification ⋮ Evolutionary stable strategies: A review of basic theory ⋮ A theory for the evolutionary game ⋮ The gradual decline of cooperation: Endgame effects in evolutionary game theory ⋮ The ideal free distribution: a review and synthesis of the game-theoretic perspective ⋮ Regular and chaotic cycling in models of ecological genetics ⋮ Revisiting matrix games: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies ⋮ Worker-Queen conflict and the evolution of social insects ⋮ Competition, kin selection, and evolutionary stable strategies ⋮ \(G\)-functions for the hermeneutic circle of evolution ⋮ Evolutionary games ⋮ A report on evolutionarily stable strategy: Modelling the effects of behaviour on evolution ⋮ Stability in an evolutionary game

Cites Work

• The qualitative analysis of a difference equation of population growth
• Phenotypic structure and bifurcation behavior of population models
• The dynamics of density dependent population models
• Competition between phenotypes
• On the nature of turbulence
• Period Three Implies Chaos
• The Logic of Animal Conflict
• Differentiable dynamical systems
• Equilibrium states and the ergodic theory of Anosov diffeomorphisms