Decisions as statistical evidence and Birnbaum's confidence concept

DOI10.1007/BF00485692zbMath0375.62004MaRDI QIDQ1246208

John W. Pratt

Publication date: 1977

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

Related Items (4)

The evidence interval and the Bayesian evidence value: On a unified theory for Bayesian hypothesis testing and interval estimation ⋮ Did Pearson reject the Neyman-Pearson philosophy of statistics! ⋮ How Often Likelihood Ratios are Misleading in Sequential Trials ⋮ How to Choose a Working Model for Measuring the Statistical Evidence About a Regression Parameter

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The Neyman-Pearson theory as decision theory, and as inference theory; with a criticism of the Lindley-Savage argument for Bayesian theory
• On the Foundations of Statistical Inference

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