On the informational size of message spaces for resource allocation processes

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90123-0zbMath0384.90012OpenAlexW1999895370MaRDI QIDQ1249125

Hiroaki Osana

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90123-0

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Trade models (91B60) Information theory (general) (94A15)

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Cites Work

• Approximation in a continuous model of computing
• On the informational size of message spaces
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