Preference aggregation with randomized social orderings

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(78)90081-9zbMath0386.90005OpenAlexW2068019745MaRDI QIDQ1249885

Hugo Sonnenschein, Salvador Barberá

Publication date: 1978

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(78)90081-9

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Individual preferences (91B08)

Related Items (18)

On the structure of fuzzy social welfare functions ⋮ Fuzzy preferences and social choice ⋮ Random aggregation without the Pareto principle ⋮ Generalized Rawlsianism ⋮ Coalitional power structure without the Pareto principle ⋮ The structure of coalitional power under probabilistic group decision rules ⋮ The categorical approach to social choice theory ⋮ The representative agent model of probabilistic social choice ⋮ The structure of strategy-proof random social choice functions over product domains and lexicographically separable preferences ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic decision schemes for one-dimensional single-peaked preferences ⋮ Salvador Barberà ⋮ An axiomatic theory of political representation ⋮ Sophisticated preference aggregation ⋮ SSB utility theory: An economic perspective ⋮ Distribution of coalitional power under probabilistic voting procedures ⋮ Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers ⋮ Social Choice Theory ⋮ Efficient and binary consensus functions on transitively valued relations

Cites Work

• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance

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