Firm behavior under imperfectly enforceable pollution standards and taxes
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Publication:1250792
DOI10.1016/0095-0696(78)90003-7zbMath0388.90017OpenAlexW2082821795MaRDI QIDQ1250792
Publication date: 1978
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(78)90003-7
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